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Source: *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 18, No. 2, Special Issue on Theories of Peace (1981), pp. 183-199

Published by: [Sage Publications, Ltd.](#)

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# Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace<sup>\*</sup>

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An important task in peace research has always been and will always be the exploration of the concept of peace. The approach taken to this in the present article is to see the concept of peace in the light of the social cosmology of various civilizations, roughly spanning the classical Occident-Orient spectrum. Methodologically, the terms explored are those that usually are translated, however superficially, into 'peace' in English — and that leads to the Hebrew *shalom*, the Arabic *sala'am*, the Roman *pax*, the Greek *eirene*, the Indian *shanti* and *ahimsa*, the Chinese *ho p'ing* and *p'ing ho*, the Japanese *heiwa* and *chowa*. Some of the basic differences between these concepts are explored and efforts are made to relate these differences to less ideational, more structural aspects of the peace policies of these civilizations. The general hypothesis is that as one moves eastward from the Occident the peace concepts — and with them, the peace policies — become more and more introvert, inner-directed, away from global architectonics and towards concepts of inner harmony. In conclusion it is pointed out how humankind has been shortshifted by these concepts, having too external concepts in the Occident and too internal concepts in the Orient — leading to the obvious need for a dialogue among civilizations as to concepts of peace with the goal of arriving at richer peace concepts. In this dialogue, needless to say, the civilizations not located on the Occident-Orient spectrum would also participate even if they are not included in this particular article.

## 1. Introduction

Whereas in earlier ages the greatest spirits of humankind were working on problems of peace, in our age there is certainly a dearth of comprehensive and penetrating analyses from the leaders of our times. It may be objected that this is because they have learnt from past mistakes, abstain from grandiose peace architectonics, and dedicate themselves to the less glamorous, more laborious work of elaborating the details of a viable peace. In that case they are less rather than more successful than their predecessors as judged by the evidence<sup>1</sup> — or they are simply equally irrelevant. But if the latter is correct there is not even the attenuating circumstance that some good passage of peace rhetoric is left behind for later generations to enjoy and dissect. For what will be left behind of speeches etc. from statesmen of today in the rich countries will be amateur

economics rather than amateur peace research.

But earlier ages present us with gold mines of peace thinking, particularly when the horizon is extended outside the Occidental spectrum to include, at least, major parts of the Orient. One thesis that can be put forward immediately is the following: whereas in our age people seem by and large content to conceive of peace = absence of war, particularly of major wars, more particularly the absence of nuclear war between superpowers, the peace concepts of other periods and places were much richer in content. Together they constitute a range of visions, of goals for humankind out of which absence of violence is *one*; it is not always given priority, or even included. We may not agree particularly with such historical sentiments, given the increasing destructiveness of warfare. But the task is to learn from past thinking — they will not respond to our teaching anyhow — and in so doing a remarkable book, *Studies in the Problems of Peace* by Bouquet and Murty<sup>2</sup> as well as an article by Takeshi Ishida<sup>3</sup> will serve as very useful guides.

\* Paper presented at the symposium 'Science and Peace', 16th World Congress of Philosophy, Düsseldorf, August 30, 1978, and the Third Nordic Macro Symposium, Sandbjerg, Denmark, Sept. 1978. The paper is also a contribution to the Goals, Processes, and Indicators of Development Project, and is Paper No. 16 from Trends in Western Civilization Program, University of Oslo.

## 2. *Peace concepts in the Occident*

Peace, however conceived of, is a characteristic of some 'system': intra-personal, inter-personal, intra-societal, inter-societal, intra-global (and here we choose to stop). It is a concept applied to a system, hence it will necessarily be colored by the traditions governing concept-formation and system-creation in that civilization. If Occidental civilizations differ from Oriental civilization in the sense that there may be said to be more similarity within than between these vast categories, then this should be reflected in the peace concepts. They are *species* of a certain *genus*, and as they refer to vast, ephemeral and deep states or processes, close to or identical with the final goal, the ultimate *telos* of humankind, the *genus* reflected in them will have to be even more vast, ephemeral, and deep. The cosmology or deep ideology of the civilization may be such a concept,<sup>4</sup> and in the Western case this would lead to two immediate predictions about peace concepts: they will tend to make a very clear distinction between in-group and out-group, center and periphery, or however one might refer to a distinction between 'us' and 'them'; and they will tend to be universalizing, encompassing the whole (known) universe. The Weber distinction between *Binnenmoral* and *Aussenmoral*<sup>5</sup> would be reflected, seeing 'peace' as something pertaining to relations within the in-group and war as something referring to relations between in-group and out-group, as well as (but this is less significant insofar as it does not concern 'us') relations within the out-group.

Thus, one would expect Western peace concepts to deal with the world as a whole, one way or the other — *either* by planning 'peace' for us in the center as a state of affairs regulating internal relations at the same time as external relations based on defensive or even offensive activities are prepared, *or* by extending the peace concept to the whole world, universal peace, but in that case according to Western concepts, or even administered from the West, one way or the other. Obviously, these two can be

combined in the idea of a *justum bellum* against the outgroup, the periphery, a war for peace, a final war, with a view to extend in-group, Western peace to the whole world, by westernizing the world one way or the other.

2.1 *The Hebrew tradition.* The word 'shâlôm', often translated as 'peace' seems to stand for a relationship between Jahve and His chosen people of Israel, a contract that sooner or later will result in Justice and Prosperity for that people.<sup>6</sup> One possible interpretation might be that it refers to *peace with God*, with Jahve/Jehovah, and not with other peoples. As this is a pact that cannot be extended to others, proselytizing becomes meaningless: what is meaningful is to raise all Jews to an understanding of this 'special relationship'. Jahve becomes a tribal god, not a universal god in the standard Western sense. Thus He becomes very exclusive, and His people very much a chosen people, capable of administering peace unto others by virtue of this special relationship:


- He will decide the disputes of the nations,  
and settle many a people's case,  
till swords are beaten into ploughshares  
and spears into pruning-hooks,  
no nation draws the sword against another,  
and no longer shall men learn to fight.  
(*Isaiah, Ch.*)
- A wonder of a counsellor,  
a divine hero,  
a father for all time,  
a peaceful prince!  
Great is his authority,  
endless is his peace,  
over David's throne  
and his dominion,  
to base it firm and stable,  
on justice and good order,  
from henceforth and forever —  
thanks to the jealous care of the Eternal!  
(*Isaiah, Ch. 9*)
- He will strike down the ruthless with his  
verdicts,  
and slay the unjust with his sentences,  
Justice shall gird him up for action,  
He shall be belted with trustworthiness.  
The wolf shall couch then with the lamb,  
the leopard's lair shall be the kid's!  
the lion shall eat straw like any ox,

wolf and lion shall graze side by side,  
herded by a little child — —  
him shall the nations then consult,  
and his seat shall be famous.

(Isaiah, XI)

— That all nations, races, and folk of every  
tongue,  
shoud serve him; his dominion is a lasting  
dominion,  
never to pass away, and his kingdom never  
shall be overthrown.  
(Daniel, Ch. 7)

The message seems clear: a Divine Ruler emerges from the Chosen People somehow embodying the pact with Jahve, and by virtue of this relation that ‘peaceful prince’ can decide the disputes of the nations ‘thanks to the jealous care of the Eternal’, he shall be consulted, his seat shall be famous even to the point that everybody else shall serve him and his dominion will last forever. The structure seems to be something like this:



Peace in the sense of settled disputes, swords into ploughshares, and all those animals side by side is not seen as a relation directly among nations, races and tongues, but as something that comes about by consulting and serving ‘Him’. Shâlôm is vertical, a pact fortifying the Jahve-Divine Prince-Chosen People relation, making it possible for them to work such wonders. No wonder that ‘Thou shalt not kill’ from the Decalogue seems to ‘refer to private murder, and does not seem to be prohibitory of organized war’,<sup>7</sup> for much war may be needed to ‘strike down the ruthless with his verdicts, and slay the unjust with his sentences’.

2.2 *The early Christian tradition.* Perhaps Jesus of Nazareth identified with Daniel’s ‘he’, perhaps not.<sup>8</sup> At any rate, the teachings

of Christ seem to differ in a very significant way: there is the special relation with ‘my Father in heaven’, but there is not the reference to the Chosen People (that may have come later, almost definitely by the time Constantine made Christianity *religio lecita*, + 313). Jesus spoke of a New Order, a *basileia*, a Kingdom/Commonwealth of God/the Heavens — and ‘My kingdom is not of this world’. Bouquet sees in Jesus Christ peace in the sense of *agapé*, ‘the verbal synonym and embodiment of active good-will, self-giving and all-embracing’.<sup>9</sup> The best expression is found in the Sermon on the Mount, for instance:

— ‘When you are reviled and persecuted and lied about because you are my followers — wonderful! Be happy about it! Be very glad! for a tremendous reward awaits you up in heaven. And remember, the ancient prophets were persecuted too.

(Matthew 5: 11-12)

There is reference to the prophets — like in the famous (verse 17): ‘Don’t misunderstand why I have come — it isn’t to cancel the laws of Moses and the warnings of the prophets. No, I came to fulfil them, and to make them all come true.’ But there is no special position for the Chosen People, not even for ‘my followers’ who are not promised that they will be consulted and served and establish an ever-lasting dominion — in this life. Whatever rewards are for the after-life (Mathew, 5:3-10). And then he goes on even contradicting Moses on eye-for-eye, tooth-for-tooth — ‘But I say: Don’t resist violence! If you are slapped on one cheek, turn the other too’ (5: 39).

What all this means in terms of peace practice is far from clear — had it been clear ‘my followers’ would have disagreed less among themselves throughout two millennia. What seems clear, however, is that peace is also here a derived relationship between people, derived from the relation each one should have to ‘my Father in Heaven’,

as told to them by Jesus Christ. The supreme virtue and goal is in the relation to God and Jesus Christ; a peaceful relation among men will follow if the former is correct. It becomes like the figure above for the Hebrew tradition, without the Chosen People. As for Jesus all peoples seemed to be equal, and all of them potentially equally much 'my followers' (Matthew, 28: 18-20), he of course could not be the Messiah of the Chosen People only — and was in fact the founder of a new religion. Peace is still steered by the relation to God, but whereas in the Hebrew tradition it was then to be imposed and administered by the Chosen People, in the early Christian tradition it would follow from correctly enacting the Christian faith. Later on the Chosen Church and the Princes ordained by it took the place of the Chosen People.

**2.3 The Islam tradition.** Islam seems to be very typical of the general Western pattern, with a clear dichotomy of the world in two abodes or 'houses', the *dar-al-Islam* (the House of Islam, the house of peace) and the *dar-al-harb*, the house of war.<sup>10</sup> Peace within, war among the non-believers — and 'in theory there was always a condition of hostility between the two *dars*, and although it was open to preach Islam persuasively, the caliph or his officers were expected to offer, either capitulation and the payment of *jizya*, or else a fight to the death'.<sup>11</sup> As for Christianity so also for Islam: everybody was a potential believer, as Allah is a universal god; and to make Islam dominant in the world 'Moslem lawyers have distinguished four different ways by which the believer may fulfil his obligation to *jihad* ('struggle', 'exertion'), by his heart, his tongue, his hands, and his sword'.<sup>12</sup>

Thus, *jihad* may become a *justum bellum* but does not have to; one obvious condition is whether the military power would be sufficient.<sup>13</sup> 'Relations with the *dar-al-harb* did not mean continuous fighting, but a permanent state of hostility'.<sup>14</sup> It should be noted that this is very different from the Hebrew

concept since Jahve was not for all to enter into a pact with. Under the Hebrew tradition one might go to war to impose Jahve's will as revealed to His people; under Islam (like under later Christianity) to impose a direct link to Allah/God from which peace would follow — as the outsider now would come inside the *dar-al-Islam* where peace should reign. One may agree with Ishida, however, when he says that 'the fierce antagonism between Israel and the Arab countries — seems to have been caused partly by a common tradition of monotheism and a similar militant concept of peace as a realization of justice by the divine will'.<sup>15</sup> And yet there is a difference between wanting to bring others inside (Islam) and forever keeping them outside (Judaism) — the two monotheisms are both compatible with aggression, but are nevertheless quite different.

**2.4 The Greek tradition.** By and large the picture here seems clear, with the highly important exception of Alexander the Great (but then he was a Macedonian, not a Greek): *eirene* ('peace') is an in-group relation as is also *homonoia* ('harmony').<sup>16</sup> It should apply to the household, to the village, to the city-state — and the maximum extension, a very audacious one, would be to all Greeks. Major figures in Western civilization, such as Plato and Aristotle, drew very sharp lines between Greeks and barbarians. The non-Greeks were only fit to be slaves — to Aristotle there were races born to be masters and races born to be slaves; the latter to be treated like animals or plants. 'Plato said that disorder in Hellas was worse than a war against outsiders, since barbarians were the natural enemies of the Greek'.<sup>17</sup> Sparta was admired by Plato (and by Diogenes, Zeno, Rousseau, and Nietzsche). Isocrates was the universalist among them: he wanted all Greeks united in brotherhood, and then war against the Persians to make slaves out of them. The concept of 'natural enemy' is important here: it makes peace thinking extended to relations with the out-

group, not to mention within the out-group, meaningless. The relation will forever remain one of enmity, and relations within the out-group are either uninteresting (who cares how plants relate to each other?) or brutish.

Alexander the Great seems to have wanted *homonoia* extended to a *politeia* which would be a world state, and not only that: he also seems to have thought in terms of *koinonia*, partnership, between Macedonians and Persians, i. e. not a *politeia* with a center where he himself came from.<sup>18</sup> W. W. Tarn, in his famous book about Alexander, seems to argue that Zeno and the Stoics in general are influenced by Alexander rather than vice versa — an Alexander obviously inspired by the peoples he had beaten in war. Whatever the case, it should be noted that the Greek concepts of people relate to each other directly, not via faith in a god or submission to the chosen and the believers. The concept is rational, as one would expect from the Greeks, not metaphysical.<sup>19</sup>

**2.5 The Roman tradition.** The Roman *pax*, related to *pactum* (*pacta sunt servanda*) was also a direct concept of order (including absence of violence) and unity — but no doubt an order and a unity with a center — the center of the Roman Empire.<sup>20</sup> *Homonoia* became *concordia* ('harmony'), extended, like citizenship, ultimately to everybody living in the Roman Empire and accepting the ruling from the center. The philosophical underpinning may have come from Stoics, but it is hard to believe that the Romans did not also have a relatively clear distinction between the Empire and the barbarians outside. *Homonoia* among all Greeks, incidentally, would have had to be based on some kind of balance of power because of the multi-centric (or at least bicentric) structure of the Greek world; *concordia* in the Roman Empire could be and had to be uni-centric. The Romans did not have to develop a balance of power philosophy as a basis for peace. They developed law, 'through the writings of Cicero, Stoic notions passed into Roman Law, and Law came to occupy the

place of religion for many Romans. Many of the sentences in the U.N. Charter read like passages from Cicero'.<sup>21</sup> Marcus Aurelius, of course, was a Stoic.

The *pax romana*, then, in the peak period of the Roman Empire (say, under the Antonines) was 'peace' in the sense of 'absence of violence', but certainly not in the sense of justice and prosperity for the periphery of the Empire — and the barbarians, at least the distant barbarians, were not included in the *pax*. As a concept it was compatible with the type of system that ultimately proved too exploitative, both of nature and of the internal and external proletariats. At the same time it was a system that facilitated centralized bureaucracy and trade and taxation, enriching a numerically small elite in the center.<sup>22</sup> This is important, for these are among the connotations or correlates of *pax* as a system of law, a *jus gentium* that evidently served some much better than others. Nevertheless this is the dominant peace concept in the Western world, internal order and unity, often exploitative, with *si vis pacem, para bellum* (in fact also against internal revolts).

**2.6. The Middle Ages.** The interesting thing about this period, the Oriental time pocket in Occidental history,<sup>23</sup> is that it did not produce peace plans. Of course, there was a conception: the *pax oecumenica* or *pax ecclesiae* of the Christian Commonwealth, outlined in Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*. As the successor system to the Roman Empire in the West was a large number of relatively small units, by and large with the same faith, this could work with the Church as a unifying factor, perhaps with normative rather than remunerative or punitive power. Wars were of smaller scale because the political units also were of a smaller scale. Although different from the Roman Empire and perhaps resting on a common faith more than on common law, the system was still at a higher level uni-centric. However, the basic reason why it worked was perhaps precisely that the units were small and not too concerned with what went on outside

— that came later. No doubt the basic meaning given to any word that might have been translated as ‘peace’ during this period must have been ‘inner peace, peace of the soul, of the mind’.<sup>24</sup>

2.7. *The modern period.* The contrast with the ‘modern period’, which is here dated from the high Middle Ages, the ‘Middle Ages Renaissance’, is considerable. In a sense the whole story of Western peace plans is the story of the two themes mentioned in the beginning of this section: in-group/out-group and universalism, but then a universalism with the center in the West. To quote some of the most important examples:<sup>25</sup>

‘Ingroup Peace Against the Outgroup’

- 1306 Pierre du Bois *De Recuperatione Terrae Sanctae*  
General peace in Christendom to reconquer the Holy Land.
- 1324 Marsiglio di Padova *Defensor Pacis*
- 1460 Marini, for George Podebrad.  
Federation of Christian princes to fight the Turks.  
Henry VIII (England) and François I (France).  
Universal peace with collective security against the Turks.
- 1620 Duc de Sully, for Henri IV (France)  
*Grand dessein*  
Europe as a federation of 15 states using arbitration, designed to limit the power of the Habsburg dynasty and for war with the Turks.
- 1814 Henri St. Simon.  
European Federation, starting with England-France, others join Federal parliament, central administration of utilities as Europeans are racially superior, Europeans should colonize (shadow of the Churchill 1940 plan and the European Community).

Many more could be mentioned. However, the political reality went in another direction, or, rather, practised the ingroup/out-group idea not at the federation level but at the nation-state level. The idea of peace within the nation-state, and any kind of behavior without, becomes the dominant theme — in other words, the peace area contracts, leaving a mosaic of more or less

homogeneous states in shifting alliances, but basically elevating the vice of amorality at the international level into a virtue. The in-group/outgroup plans mentioned have at least a federal element in them because they are alliances: the tradition carried on by NATO and WTO in our days.

Thus, Machiavelli saw amorality in the behavior among the Italian city-state not only as a fact, but also as a norm — the question was how to do it as well as possible. One may ask: where is the peace concept in that, and the answer is all the time: *within*. Jean Bodin (1530-96), in *De Republica*, elaborates a theory of the unified states with central authority vested in the monarch, this is where the *summa potestas* is located, *majestas*. But it is for Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) to formulate a more explicit, although rather minimal, peace theory in *Leviathan*. There is a covenant between people and their sovereign whereby the sovereign protects them against each other since their natural tendency is to get at each other’s throats, whereby life becomes ‘nasty, brutish and short’. But there is a price to pay for this covenant and the effective rule by the sovereign: ‘People thereafter have no right to rebellion, because the covenant obliges them to obey the sovereign power, whereas the sovereign is not bound by any contract.’<sup>26</sup> Moreover, ‘The relations among states are conceived by Hobbes as being analogous to those among men in the state of nature, i. e. war of all against all’, the *bellum omnium contra omnes*.<sup>27</sup>

In the Peace of Westphalia (1648) this system is crystallized,<sup>28</sup> ‘a deathblow to the lingering notion that all Christendom was a unity’. Since this is by and large the dominant system today, the major rationalizations, in this context, are the efforts to show that it is peace productive. Thus, to G. W. Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) ‘people afraid to tolerate sovereignty at home fall prey to subjugation from abroad’.<sup>29</sup> Universal peace will never work, for each unit will dialectically create others as their enemies — a peace federation somewhere will create an

antagonistic federation or state elsewhere. 'The state is an individual and individuality essentially implies negation.'<sup>30</sup> By endowing the state with individuality, like an organism with personality, German cleverness in theory construction, essentialism and reification (not to mention deification, here of the military, the absolutist state) is made ample use of. Thus, there is a direct line Machiavelli-Hobbes-Hegel and Fichte — to which von Clausewitz (1780-1831) added romanticization of war, so did Rousseau (who 'did not decry war, but took it as the test of true spirit')<sup>31</sup> — and, of course, Nietzsche (1844-1900) with his distinction between Herren-moral and Herden-moral, and his contempt for Buddhism, Christianity and humility which 'is but a disguise for the will to power'.<sup>32</sup>

The logical culmination of this is, of course, nazism/fascism, for instance as formulated by the Italian theoretician of fascism Alfredo Rocco (Mussolini's minister of justice). He traced his ideas back to Greece, to 'the twin concepts of a regimented military state, and a sovereign state based on inequality and entitled to demand the sacrifice of individuals when necessary'.<sup>33</sup> Like Aristotle he believed that men were fundamentally evil and need dictatorship by an elite at home; that democracy is impossible as seen in the Greek city-state (Plato!) and the Italian city-state (Machiavelli!), and that states in order to offer internal security and enough food to eat — the two great benefits for the people — have to be strong (and vice versa). So, here is the state divided into free men and slaves, essentially, offering the satisfaction of basic material needs (security and welfare) and internal order (the trains running on time) in return for giving the elites a free hand, within and without.

#### 'Universalism with a Western Center'

We shall only mention some, and one should note the difference in the authors: this is where the great spirits enter, the philo-

sophers also well known from other fields. It took that kind of person to think large, in universal terms — the others mentioned above were too tied to statesmen and politicians, too busy adjusting thinking to their power politics, one might surmise. Perhaps it also took the kind of invulnerability real greatness bestows on some people to think that large and yet get away with it — even to the point of getting into the annals of political thought.<sup>34</sup>

- 1310 Dante Alighieri *De Monarchia*  
An *universale imperium*, the whole united under supreme government, secular; and all of it ruled according to Roman Law.
- 1517 Desiderius Erasmus *The Complaint of Peace*  
Inter-state arbitration by a body consisting of the Pope, bishops, abbots and 'wise men' — with an ethical basis.
- 1625 Hugo Grotius *De Jure Belli et Pacis*  
Sovereign states to be bound by international law, an assembly of Christian princes to deliberate and propose sanctions.
- 1692 William Penn *An Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe*  
'The first scheme which openly says that no universal peace is possible without the inclusion of Russians and Turks.'
- 1713 Charles René Castel de St. Pierre *Paix Perpétuelle* (edited by Rousseau 1761) although conceived of as a *republique européenne*, it was not directed against anybody and looked on principle open. Plenipotentiaries of Sovereigns to meet in permanent Council, to settle matters by arbitration; chairmanship on rotation; expenses shared; internal self-determination; no armed force to be used by individual states; sanctions against offenders.
- 1786 Jeremy Bentham *A Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace*  
Anti-colonialism, International Court of Judicature, a Congress or Diet of States, abolition of secret diplomacy — decisions made by the people themselves; all Christians to support peace.
- 1795 Immanuel Kant *Zum ewigen Frieden*  
States cannot be traded with, not being a *patrimonium* but a society of people; standing armies to be gradually abolished; non-intervention; restraint if there is a war; republican constitutions; Law of Nations based on federations; submission to Providence, living according to Natural Law; consult philosophers.

Here we choose to stop. There is universalism, yet a limitation to Roman Law, the Christian Pope, Christian Princes, Europe (but not in an aggressive way), and even Bentham and Kant did not question the universality of their thinking — relying on Christians and philosophers (of their own kind).

How would one place marxism in this picture? It is original in many ways, yet very Western. It combines the ingroup/outgroup principles with universalism with a Western center very well. Thus, it is Hegelian with the difference that for states are substituted classes; 'peace' in the Marxian sense to be obtained by maximum ingroup peace — working class solidarity — which will provoke dialectically even more cohesiveness on the other side. But then there is the transcendence in a sense missing in Hegelian thinking: the contradiction will be overcome by the proletariat asserting itself over the bourgeoisie, possibly through armed struggle and a period of dictatorship, in one country after the other. Only in a world of socialist states can there be peace, (1) because there is no longer exploitation within the countries and (2) because the forces in capitalism that make for external war (securing raw materials and markets to make accumulated capital profitable) are no longer present. Marxism has been concerned with the infrastructure of peace, with the forces making for war, more than with the superstructure, the architectonics of peace — with very important contributions to the former, very little in terms of how socialist states should be organized so as to secure peace (beyond the idea of preventing them from sliding back to capitalism)<sup>35</sup>. Peace concepts would emphasize justice in the sense of absence of exploitation, not in the sense of absence of violence.


The idea is universal, applying to all countries, and rooted in the West by assuming that all countries will go through the *Stufengang* (primitive, slave, serf, capitalist, socialist) of the West. To bring a non-

Western society into History by hitching it solidly into the *Stufengang* is, consequently, a way of working for peace in the long run — which produces the strange result that colonialism ultimately comes out as work for peace, as progressive.<sup>36</sup> On the other hand, 'peace' does not belong to the Marxian vocabulary in any fundamental way; hence this is not included here as a 'peace plan'.

Looking through these Western plans it is interesting to see how little has happened since. The International Court of Justice is obviously a reflection of what Grotius wrote in 1625; the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations reflections of what St. Pierre published in 1713.<sup>37</sup> Both of them must have been deeply impressed by belligerent forces let loose by the emerging state system, trying to tame these forces, yet respect them. One may say that the West today is gambling on both main tendencies at the same time: *both* the ingroup/outgroup principle as reflected in the *si vis pacem para bellum* systems of the NATO and the WTO, or the OECD/EC/CMEA systems in the economic fields, *and* the Western-centered universalism of the United Nations family. If the latter is becoming less Western-centered it is against the protest of the West. Alexander the Great's *homonoia* at the world *politeia* level, his *koinonia*, is still very far from being realized — and it is not even very clear what it might mean.

Alexander wanted partnership between the Macedonians and the Persians; it does not look as if he wanted either to change and become like the latter. The Western approach if the shoe does not fit is to change the foot — to westernize other countries until they fit a Western model. The key tool here is state-formation, the building of the state as an organization, with its *summa potestas*, ready and ripe to join a union of states.

In conclusion, let us try to capture the evolution in Western thought in diagrammatic form:



A circle is a peace system with low probability of war.

- I stands for the Greek ingroup/outgroup system
- II for the Roman ingroup/outgroup system with *Herrschaft* from the center rather than *Partnerschaft*
- III for the vague arrangement during the Middle Ages, chaotic, fluid, secured through normative power among others sources
- IV for the modern period replay of the Greek ingroup/outgroup model
- V for the modern period replay of the Roman centrist model, for the whole world, and
- VI for true *Partnerschaft* universalism — so far not even worked out on paper for reasons to be explored in 3 and 4 below.

### 3. Peace Concepts in the Orient

It is probably correct to say that the Orient is far more heterogeneous in cosmology than the Occident; yet some cross-cutting characteristics of the peace concepts produced in the Orient may at least be put forward as working hypotheses. Thus, it is not to be expected that Oriental concepts will be universal, applying to all of humankind. This is not because they did not know the rest of the world, nor because they did not care — after all the outside world was invading India, for instance, almost incessantly. Rather, it may be because what is outside their own kind, however that is defined, is seen as so profoundly different that they are not even included in the cosmologies as a periphery to be exploited. In other words, the civilizations in the Orient are here seen


as conceiving of themselves as more self-contained: when plans are made it is for themselves. Their concern is not global architectonics on their own premisses or not; their concern is to come to grips with themselves. Where the Occident — except for the Middle Ages — was extrovert and centrifugal, always feeling it had to strive for a ‘global reach’ in action or at least in theory and conceptually, the Orient is more introvert, more centripetal.<sup>38</sup>

This should also lead to another difference. The ultimate in extrovert peace planning is peace for the universe; the ultimate in introvert peace planning is the peace in one’s own soul, intra-personal peace, harmony of mind. As the former should be overrepresented in the Occident the latter should be overrepresented in the Orient, relatively speaking. But since neither world can be defined as the horns of clearcut dilemmas there will be something of each in both — only that the emphasis, the point of gravity may differ. The basic point is to establish some relation between the way peace is conceived of and the general cosmological orientation found in civilization on the one hand and the social interests of those who formulate the peace plans — or peace *concepts* in the Oriental case — on the other.

3.1 *The Indian tradition.* In the classical Hindu caste system the warriors, the *kshatriyas* were second to the top, to the brahmins. This had at least three consequences: war was conducted by a caste, hence circumscribed by rules, not developing into the all-out warfare that professionalism may lead to. On the other hand, their high position testifies to the far from pacifist nature of


Hindu society. And then, on the other hand again: not being quite on the top like the military feudal lords in Europe and the *samurais* in Japan opened for ways of domesticating belligerent inclinations, and also for thinking about peace different from peace as order and unity, as absence of war within and preparation for war without; so typical of the Western tradition. Thus, the Hindi word for 'peace', *shanti*, seems best to be understood as 'a well-ordered state of mind'.<sup>39</sup>

In the tradition of *Jainism* 'everything possesses a soul. Since the universe is an organic whole, governed by cosmic order, all the living beings in it are fellow members of one another. The universe is a sort of republic of souls, having no creator, and no master except the moral law that governs them'.<sup>40</sup> 'The supreme virtue, according to Jainism, is noninjury to all living beings (*ahimsâ*).' The basic assumption is that 'we are members of a creator-less republic of souls',<sup>41</sup> and — probably — that the relation between our bodies should reflect the relations that exists in that republic. Diagrammatically it may look something like this:



In the tradition of *Buddhism* a step forward is taken beyond *ahimsâ* interpreted as (passive) abstention from injury to an interpretation in terms of compassion, good works, and reconciliation of *ahimsâ* with justice. 'Thus, in Buddhism it ceases to become negative, and gains a positive value.'<sup>42</sup> But then the metaphysics is different: 'we are one with all because there is no self',<sup>43</sup> and 'to identify oneself with a particular body and think others as foreign is irrational in a world which is a continuance of interconnected events'.<sup>44</sup> Thus, Buddhism seems

to establish an even stronger interconnectedness between human beings:



The first Buddhist vow, 'I take upon myself the vow of abstaining from causing hurt to human beings' comes natural, but this is the limited interpretation of *ahimsa*, and even more limited than the Jainist concept as it applies to human beings, not to all life. Like for Jainism it should be noticed that there is no God, no Divine Prince — it just *is* like this, it is a question of seeing in a deep sense the Truth of this, and act accordingly. Human beings are related not indirectly by having the same Creator of all human beings, the same Father in Heaven (which would make us all siblings who should love each other because we have the same Father); human beings are 'coupled' directly, and even more so in Buddhism than in Jainism.

In the tradition of *Gandhism* this is carried still a step further. Gandhi, the Hindu, seems to come closer to the Buddhist than the Jainist interpretation of *ahimsâ*, but adds to a positive interpretation a positive method, *satyagraha*.<sup>45</sup> The oneness of all human beings, and indeed all life, is the basic premise: not only that to hurt one is to hurt us all, but also the positive aspect that whatever good one does is done to us all. Whereas in Christianity the souls seem to be detached from each other, only attached to God, so that whatever one does of good or bad is done to (registered in) God, in Jainism, Buddhism, and Gandhism the coupling is direct.

**3.2 The Chinese tradition.** Here — as opposed to Europe, India, and Japan — the military did not figure in the classical caste/class systems; they seemed to have no social status at all.<sup>46</sup> Most revered were the intellectuals, and then particularly the sages who in 'The period of hundred philosophers',

from -500, were both prolific and dominant. There was the Buddhist trend with its collectivist emphasis, the Daoist trend, also metaphysical, and dialectic, and then the Confucian tradition, assuming 'an affirmative attitude to the secular world, unlike traditional Indian ethics, the aim of which was to escape from the world'.<sup>47</sup> Just as for India, the concept of peace directed the attention inwards; it was unconcerned with the outside world and its relation to it, very much concerned with the inner state of mind and the inculcation of personal virtue in the individual, and with the political order, which as usual should include absence of violence. As an indication of how close these concepts came to each other in Chinese thinking, Ishida maintains that the same two characters were used, in the order *ho p'ing* to denote political order, and in the order *p'ing ho* to denote 'a well-ordered state of mind'. However, as if this were not close enough, either order of writing could also carry the other meaning.

**3.3 The Japanese tradition.** Ishida finds similarities with the Chinese, which is not strange given the use of Chinese characters, and the influence of Buddhism. On the other hand, the military *samurai* had a leading position in the hierarchy, and shintoism, very much revived after the transformation of Tokugawa feudalism into Meiji nationalism,<sup>48</sup> was clearly nationalistic and provided the context within which the Emperor was seen as divine (he had to renounce this status in the famous broadcast during the US occupation). Thus, the Japanese concept *heiwa* (and its parallel, *wahei*) had the same double meaning as the Chinese counterparts. It implies an adaptation to a social order, both in social action and in state of mind, but that social order was more nationalist and more pyramidal than China. Hence, peace = *heiwa* = harmony (*chowa* is another term) may simply mean not to disturb the war effort!

But this is the concept we also know from the Western tradition in general: peace

within, in order better to deal with the outside. Of course, Japan is very small relative to the land masses that make up India and China; she has to relate to the outside, to *gai-koku* (outside-country, 'abroad') — by isolation (Tokugawa period) by imperialist aggression (from the Sino-Japanese war 1894-95 till the capitulation in 1945 — fifty years), by economic expansionism with 'peaceful' means (say, 1955 till?). Japan is *one*, very homogeneous, geographically well-defined,<sup>49</sup> and after Meiji organized according to the twin maxims of verticality and collectivism — by and large. If Japan had had sufficiently similar neighbors, peace thinking in the sense of (con)federations within, various types of defensive or aggressive behavior without, might have ensued — and there would have been the Western succession of peace plans by federating a small part of the world. What would not have developed in Japanese thinking, however, would have been the universalism of Western thought. One thing is to relate to *gai-koku*, seeing it as a threat or as a resource or as both; quite another to try to think in terms of the world as a whole. More recently it may look as if Japan is catching up with the Western strategy of using universal organization for their purpose, but their contributions to these organizations seem to be limited to plans for their own elevation into higher positions.<sup>50</sup>

Thus, the thesis may be put forward — not a very original one — that there is an intimate connection between peace thinking and the geo-political situation of the country/region that produces it; not only between peace thinking and the general social cosmology. Since geo-politics is in the hands of the elites peace thinking will reflect their interests, but at the same time it has to be built on concepts that are intra-paradigmatic in that cosmology and couched in terms that are meaningful in more than a purely linguistic sense.

#### 4. Conclusion: What Next?

We are painfully aware of the shortcomings

of this review of peace concepts. In addition to all the flaws in what is covered comes the biggest flaw: the peace concepts outside these 'civilizations'. But let us nevertheless speculate on this basis. The world is dynamic, so are the peace concepts, there will be leads and lags, and one impressive finding is the extent to which Western thought has preceded, and to a large extent caused, Western efforts at peace building. It would be far-fetched to say that those who drew up the plans for the League of Nations and the United Nations were 'the prisoners of some intellectual long time dead', but there is something to it. To the extent that one feels those institutions on the average do more good than bad this may serve as an encouragement to those interested in peace studies, and *constructive* (as distinct from merely empirical or merely critical) peace studies at that.<sup>51</sup>

So, let us try to extract some findings from this study.

4.1 *The poverty of the present dominant peace concept.* We take it that the peace concept that dominates contemporary theory and practice is the Roman *pax*, in the sense of *pactum* and *absentia belli*. This raises the question of whose interests this concept serves, and the answer is obvious: those who are interested in *status quo* internally, and in unimpeded communication and transportation externally. *Pax* domestically speaking becomes the medium in which exploitation can go on unabated; *pax* internationally the medium in which trade can go on unabated. Interestingly enough, *pax* is also the medium in which for instance warships may cruise in foreign waters unimpeded; when a war is on, that would invite all kinds of trouble. For the economically and militarily superior, *pax*, consequently, may permit more control than war; it pays not only economically, but also in terms of political control. This shows very clearly how narrow the concept is, and how much it is custom-tailored to the specific interests of specific groups.<sup>52</sup>

4.2 *The richness of the range of peace concepts.* Of course, there is the obvious methodological objection that the concepts examined are mainly tied together by the circumstance that at one time or another they tend to be translated into English as 'peace'; it may be objected that better translations would have narrowed the range. But this is not a good objection. First, it is always fruitful to examine concepts with some overlap in a connotation space even when the overlap is not perfect. And second, at a higher level all these concepts are probably relatively identical, for they stand for some of the highest goals of that tradition — they may not be autotelic, but they are at least close to it. And one may ask: given *pax* in all its narrowness, what happened to the justice and prosperity of *shâlôm*; to the self-giving and all-embracing love of *agapé* (even given that the early Christians believed the end of the world was so near that they could behave in ways normally thought impossible in human society); to the solidarity and compassion found in the *Quran* (but perhaps not built into their peace concept?); to the harmony of the *homonoia* and *eirene*; to the 'well-ordered state of mind' or 'peace of mind' of *shanti*, *p'ing ho* and *heiwa*; to the non-injury of the Jainist and the compassion of the Buddhist *ahimsâ*, not to mention that wealth of insight uncovered and partly implemented in Gandhi's *satyagraha*? It is like a panorama of human concerns, human experience and dreams crystallized in thought and words; why should we limit ourselves to such a narrow range? The answer is, of course, that we do not: all of this may be on our goal horizon. However, given the Western tendency to segment human concerns this means that *they are not considered together*. If we do not have rich concepts towards the top of our hierarchies of goals the chances are that we all become the prisoners of impoverished politics dealing with one at the time, and be striving for a menu of dust rather than for the fountain of life.

4.3 *Towards a richer peace concept.* Imagine now that we accept *pax* as a carrier of the idea of security. Leaving aside the question (rather important) of the instruments, what would we like to add, at least as a minimum? A maximum peace concept into which one puts all nice things may not be very valuable either; the problem is to steer some kind of middle course. Thus, it *may* be argued that the all-embracing love of *agapé* and the combination of non-cooperation, civil disobedience, positive action and even protection of the antagonist so typical of Gandhi's *satyagraha* belong more to the means side of the means/ends dialectic, regardless of how much it may be protested that his distinction cuts something organic artificially and mechanistically in two. What about the many who would say that strong military forces are more than instruments, that they *are* peace if one should accept fully the argument of total means-ends integration? But the other concepts present no such problem: justice and prosperity, harmony in society, between human beings, and in the mind, inside human beings? The question is more how to interpret them, for instance in the Western language in which this article is written. Thus, they are couched in philosophical and religious terms; how does that survive a translation into the sociologese and psychologese in which inter- and intra-personal states and processes are often discussed today? Does 'peace of mind' become 'mental wellbeing, mental health', and to what extent can that be said to be the same as *identity*? Is prosperity the same as *economic well-being* or *welfare*? Probably not; the latter has a connotation of satisfying basic material needs, the former (as found both in the *shâlôm* and *eirene* concepts) of becoming ever richer, even at the expense of others (who are then defined as a-human). But we do not have to accept everything in whatever has once been translated as 'peace', we can also react critically to it and say that this is our interpretation. And the same applies to justice: it could be seen as everybody's right to security, identity, welfare;

which would place it closer to *freedom*, without stretching it too far. But this is nothing but indicative, the basic point is this: there is a treasure hidden in human peace thinking; it is for us to unearth it.

4.4 *Towards a richer violence concept.* A richer peace concept implies a richer violence concept, as one is the negation of the other. Thus, if 'peace of mind' is included in the peace concept, and this is interpreted as identity, as closeness to self and others, to society and nature, to something above oneself (to make it richer than mental health concepts built around the idea of a person free from symptoms of mental disease), then everything reducing or impeding identity becomes violence. Since much of this is structural rather than the result of concrete acts of concrete actors, there is already a double extension of the violence concept: across the border-line between direct and structural violence, and across the borderline between material/somatic and nonmaterial/mental damage. Correspondingly, if social harmony is peace, disturbance of that harmony is violence — and that raises the question of what one means by harmony. Contrasting Western and Japanese concepts it may be pointed out that the former *in the present modern period*, after the Renaissance and the Reformation, tends to see harmony in balance, in equality between two or more; whereas Japanese concepts of harmony (more like the Western concepts during the Roman Empire and the Middle Ages) are more uni-centric and vertical.<sup>53</sup> Clearly a cultural difference with profound implications where concepts of peace and violence are concerned! And the same applies to 'prosperity': if it is interpreted as 'getting ever richer even at expense of others', then any effort to upset that type of exploitation is violence. But if it is interpreted as meeting basic needs, then any effort to prevent that from happening becomes violence — again a rather meaningful difference. The upshot of this is that any analysis of peace should be subjected to a corresponding analysis of

violence, thus revealing more facets of the concepts, permitting us to make more conscious choices.

4.5 *Towards world politics of a richer peace concept.* It may be asserted that the *pax* concept is more than a Western concept serving vested interests; it also represents a sort of least common denominator of a wide range of peace concepts, the minimum around which a consensus may be built even in a world that is decreasingly eurocentric. However sincerely believed in, this is blatantly wrong. An essentially inter-state concept, centered on inter-state peace and intra-state non-intervention, will tend to reproduce the Western state structure all over the world, as is indeed happening. And it can be argued that in order to achieve some of the other aspects of a composite peace concept, quite different peace structures are needed. In another context we have referred to these contrasting structures as alpha and beta structures respectively,<sup>54</sup> and they come with associated peace structures. For the large-scale vertical and centralizing alpha structure the *pax* concept fits both as a goal *and* in the sense that alpha can produce what is commonly held to be instruments for achieving that goal: a strong state backed up with strong police/military. For the small scale, more horizontal beta the *ahimsâ* and *shanti/p'ing ho/heiwa* will fit both as a goal *and* in the sense that beta produces the (mostly intangible) means for the realization of those goals.

Gandhi put it this way:

'You cannot build non-violence on a factory civilization, but it can be built on self-contained villages.'<sup>55</sup>

And Murty adds:

'It seems to me that unless citizens have access to enough land and possess sufficient tools and professional skills they cannot lead economically independent lives without recourse to capitalists or governments.'<sup>56</sup>

And he has a rather sceptical note about nation-states:

'All this makes it clear that action based on finer moral sentiment is not possible without the evolution of an appropriate political and social organization in all countries. There are real clashes of interests between nation-states, all of whom aim to be sovereign and self-sufficient; and within states there are conflicts of class interest.'<sup>57</sup>

All of this points in the direction of a world organized as a community of very many small communities. But Hugo Grotius issued an important warning 350 years ago, even basing himself on Cicero:

'Since every place has not been supplied with all the necessities of life, and since all mankind is one, whatever is produced anywhere is destined for all.'<sup>58</sup>

This might be taken as an invitation to large-scale capitalism, as practised by the modern transnational corporation. But it can also be taken as an argument in favor of the *res communis* approach, that there are things that are basic necessities for us humans, and hence should belong to all, that means to nobody in particular, not even to the state or the people on whose territory it is located.

What this all points to is neither a world of nation states, trying to regulate their basically amoral behavior; nor a world of small communities like sarvodaya villages or People's Communes, nor a world state with a center administering everything transformed by the *res communis* approach to the benefit of all. To go in for any one of these formulas would imply a bias in favor of the three major approaches to peace discussed in sections 2 and 3 above: the Western/Japanese ingroup/outgroup approach, the Indian/Chinese more inward-oriented approach, and the Western universalist approach, respectively. But maybe a combination of the three would be meaningful in a world that increasingly will have to, and also should be capable of, drawing on insights of much more than one civilization?<sup>59</sup>

For this to happen a very fluid, very flexible approach to peace will have to be taken;<sup>60</sup> no rigid uni-dimensional architectonics based on the predilection for one single type of building unit; nor the imposi-

tion of one civilization over the other, trying to reproduce itself through concept-imperialism and structural expansionism. Could anything constitute a more important task for peace researchers all over the world, in *homonoia* and *koinonia*, in the years to come? And is that not precisely what one can learn from a study like this, that one of our tasks is to help build the future — at least by preparing it conceptually?

## NOTES

1. See Johan Galtung, *The True Worlds*, New York, 1980, chapter 1.2 for some data that clearly indicate how the situation where war is concerned is steadily deteriorating.

2. A. C. Bouquet and K. Satchidananda Murty, *Studies in the Problems of Peace*, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1960. Part One, a historical survey mainly of peace thinking in the West is written by Bouquet (historian and theologian at Cambridge University). Part Two, 'Phenomenology of peace' with a very wide range, and very penetrating in the chapters on Hindu philosophy, by Murty — in a sense they are two books so I shall refer to the author, not to the authors. The book is one of the most important studies ever made in peace research and I shall, of course with quotation, make very ample use of it. — The interpretations, however, are mostly my own unless otherwise indicated, and Bouquet and Murty should not be held responsible for them.

3. Ishida Takeshi, 'Beyond the traditional concepts of peace in different cultures', *Journal of Peace Research*, 1969, pp. 133-45, also an excellent study based on the author's *Politics for Peace*, in Japanese. Paul Dimitriu, in his 'Les concepts de paix dans la civilisation gréco-latine et leurs traces dans les structures politiques du monde moderne', University of Bucharest, 1976, unpublished, also makes use of Ishida, and adds to it some remarkable insights in the contemporary situation.

4. Johan Galtung, 'Social Cosmology and Western Civilization', in Galtung, Heiestad, Rudeng, *Macro-History and Western Civilization*, forthcoming.

5. Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, Tübingen 1923.

6. The presentation is based on Ishida, p. 136, and Bouquet, pp. 35-9. Neither of them emphasizes the Chosen People aspects as much as is done in this presentation.

7. Bouquet, p. 38 — he refers to it as the sixth commandment, should be the fifth.

8. Bouquet, on whom we are leaning for this section, feels Jesus came to this identification 'to-

wards the close of his earthly life'. (*loc. cit.*). There is of course the possibility that Jesus made use of an empty status, that of the Messiah, meeting some of the requirements, reinterpreting others. In my view a very basic difference is in Jesus' transcendence from the ingroup/out/group tradition to the universalism tradition in Western thought. With the institutionalization of Christianity, its incorporation as *religio lecita* in the Roman Empire and the emergence of a strong hierarchical Catholic church a regressive movement back to the ingroup/outgroup tradition, culminating in the Crusades of the late Middle Ages (or Early Modern Period) and the aggressive missionaryism of later centuries, started.

9. Bouquet, p. 39.

10. Bouquet, pp. 44-48; Ishida, pp. 136-37.

11. Bouquet, pp. 44 f.

12. Bouquet, *loc. cit.*

13. As at present petro-dollars to a large extent are recycled through the acquisition of arms, and arms that can very well be used for offensive warfare at that, this opens for some interesting perspectives.

14. Bouquet, *loc. cit.*

15. Ishida, p. 137.

16. Ishida, p. 137, Bouquet and Murty scattered throughout their book.

17. Ishida, *loc. cit.*

18. Bouquet, pp. 31 ff. There are very few cases like this in peace thinking, but then it may also be mainly apocryphal.

19. Unless, that is, one accepts the Greek superiority complex as metaphysics.

20. Ishida, p. 137, Bouquet, pp. 49 f.

21. Murty, p. 325.

22. See Galtung, Heiestad, Rudeng, 'On the Decline and Fall of Empires: The Roman Empire and Western Imperialism Compared', in *Macro-History and Western Civilization*, forthcoming.

23. For an exploration of this perspective on Western history, see Galtung, Heiestad, Rudeng, 'On the last 2500 years in Western history, and some reflections on the coming five hundred', *The New Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. XIII, chapter XII, pp. 318-61, Cambridge 1978.

24. Dimitriu (op. cit., p. 2) makes a distinction between two types of civilization, contemplative and individual discipline; the latter will be developed peace concepts focussing on peace of mind and individual discipline; the latter will be oriented towards unity, prosperity, organization and collective action. The distinction is a fruitful one as long as it is not taken to coincide with the Orient/Occident distinction: there are highly action-oriented philosophies in the Orient as there are contemplative philosophies in the Occident.

25. Although mentioned by Bouquet in his chapter IV, the basic source for these peace plans is Sylvester John Hemleben, *Plans for World*

*Peace through Six Centuries*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1943. Also see A. C. F. Beales, *The History of Peace*, Bell, London, 1931. A fine analysis is made by Geoffrey Darnton, 'The Concept Peace', Proceedings, Fourth International Peace Research Association Conference, Bled, Yugoslavia, October 22-25 1971.

26. Murty, p. 220. Of course, people have the right of self-defence against the sovereign, it is only the sovereign that protects them that can command absolute obedience. 'Hobbes laid the foundations for an absolutist theory of the state' (*loc. cit.*), no doubt of importance for the fascist formula.

27. Murty, *loc. cit.*

28. Murty, p. 219. Of course, the internal process of building a state, with the slow emergence of a state bureaucracy based on contract rather than the feudal and more local relationship between lord and servant had started earlier, in the sixteenth century — in the Ottoman Empire even before that.

29. Murty, p. 221.

30. From Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, quoted from Murty, p. 222.

31. Murty, p. 227.

32. Murty, p. 228.

33. Murty, p. 214. It is important to see Aristotle and Plato in this perspective; it leads to a much clearer view of Western civilization. From Greek Antiquity via the Renaissance to twentieth century fascism (and it should be remembered that the latter by its creators was seen as a second Renaissance after the Italian city-states failed) there is a relatively straight line.

34. For references, see footnote 25 above.

35. One is reminded of how socialist countries seem to explain lack of ability to solve conflicts (Soviet Union-Yugoslavia, Soviet Union-China) between them by resorting to the 'explanation' that the other party is not really socialist. The explanation has to be located in the intra-social, not in the inter-societal structure — perhaps rightly so, but it is hard to escape the feeling that more creative thought and practice at the inter-societal level might also have been possible. Given the focus on intra-societal explanations the right to intervention to prevent a country from sliding back to capitalism becomes a logical, almost foregone, conclusion as peace-promoting policy.

36. For a very extensive analysis of this aspect of marxist thought see Miklós Molnár, *Marx, Engels et la politique internationale* Gallimard, Paris, 1975; parts IV: 'Marx et Engels face à l'expansion coloniale I: Le monde asiatique', pp. 189-290.

37. One might hope for a shortening of this lag time (around 250 years): the world can hardly wait that long for some major restructuring to take place.

38. This is, of course, basic in the cosmology theory referred to in footnote 4 above. For a beautiful way of stating it, take this long quote from Murty (p. 215):

'At the Congress of Vienna Czar Alexander objected to the inclusion of Turkey in the Law of Nations on the ground that it was barbarian. Similarly, Islamic culture laid it down that all the non-Muslim world (*dar-al-harb*) must be subdued and brought under control by the Muslim world (*dar-al-Islam*). On the contrary, the Hindu political thinkers insisted that a Hindu emperor's domains should not extend beyond India, Afghanistan and Ceylon (this is from Mahâbhârata, XXVII, 25). Hindu thinkers conceived it was right to achieve a sort of unity by establishing hegemony of one state over others within the same world of culture; they prohibited aggression against states belonging to other worlds of culture; as against this some Greek, Christian and Islamic thinkers thought it was right to wage wars against alien cultures.' Chinese practice throughout the millennia seems to indicate that they are on the same line as the Hindu tradition. Thus, the Western tradition is imperialist and also universalist (as it would say itself), the other tradition is geographically more restricted (although the land masses are large, and, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan, beware!), but also isolationist (as their enemies or detractors would say). Murty, himself an Indian, is well aware of this doubleness and goes on to say (*loc. cit.*):

'Hindu civilization remained stagnant and decayed, because the militarism implicit in its political theory caused the states of which it was made up to collide in perpetual destructive internecine conflicts. In such a suicidal process the social fabric as well as the cultural unity are torn asunder and become easy prey to foreign inroads. The other policy serves to preserve internal unity so long as the concept of sovereignty of individual states does not raise its ugly head, and enables the aggressive culture to dominate over other peoples and cultures and enjoy great prosperity at the expense of subject peoples. The Roman Empire both before and after Constantine and the Ottoman Empire serve to illustrate this. Both fell because of their luxury, intoxication with victory and the poverty of masses, as well as of rift within.'

39. Ishida, p. 134. The term does not appear at all in the Bouquet-Murty book.

40. Murty, pp. 176 f.

41. Murty, p. 185.

42. Murty, p. 183.

43. Murty, p. 186.

44. Murty, p. 182.

45. The books in this field are so numerous that the best the reader can do is to read Gandhi's own words, e. g., in *Non-Violence in Peace and*

*War, I & II*, M. Desai editor, Navajivan, many printings. For one analysis, see Johan Galtung and Arne Naess, *Gandhis Politiske Etikk*, Oslo, Tanum 1955 og Pax 1969.

46. Thus, in the shi-nô-kô-shô of Japan the shi included the belligerent samurai, in the shih-nung-kung-shang of China neither the shih, nor any other, includes the military.

47. Ishida, p. 138. What follows about China and Japan is mainly based on his analysis.

48. See section on shinto, in J. K. Feibleman, *Understanding Oriental Philosophy*, Mentor Books, New York, 1977, pp. 205-08.

49. See Johan Galtung, 'Japan and Future World Politics', *Jouurnal of Peace Research*, 1972, pp. 355-385.

50. See Fumiko Nishimura, 'Contemporary Japan in International Relations', *Paper*, Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva, 1978, unpublished.

51. For the distinction between empirical, critical and constructive research, see Johan Galtung, *Methodology and Ideology*, Ejlers, Copenhagen, 1977, chapter 2.

52. This, of course, is the reason why similar systems as the *pax Romana* are named after the central power: *pax Britannica*, *pax Gallica*, *pax Americana*, *pax Sovietica*. The present author has explored the extent to which the European Community heads in the same direction, see chapter 9, 'Pax Bruxellana' in *The European Community: A Superpower in the Making*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1973.

53. See the article referred to in footnote 49 above, p. 357.

54. See *Development, Environment and Technology*, chapter 1, Geneva, UNCTAD, 1979.

55. From *For Pacifists*, p. 101, quoted from Murty, p. 199.

56. Murty, p. 327.

57. Murty, p. 318.

58. Murty, p. 325. It is taken from Hugo Grotius, *The Freedom of the Seas*, Oxford University Press, 1916, p. 7.

59. See Johan Galtung, 'On Alpha and Beta and Their Many Combinations', paper for Subproject 'Visions of Desirable Societies', Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development Project, United Nations University.

60. Dimitriu, *op. cit.*, p. 9, is so kind as to refer to the present author's 'Entropy and the General Theory of Peace', *Essays in Peace Research*, Vol. I, chapter 2, pp. 47-75, Ejlers, Copenhagen 1975, also in *Proceedings*, Second International Peace Research Association Conference, Tällberg, August 1967, published from Assen, 1968.

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